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认知的封闭

维基百科,自由的百科全书

科学哲学心灵哲学中,认知的封闭是指,人类的心灵是没有能力解决一些讨论了很久的哲学问题的。[1] 欧文·弗兰纳根英语Owen Flanagan把这种立场叫做非建设性自然主义新神秘主义的首提倡者柯林·麦金英语Colin McGinn[2][3]称其为先验自然主义,承认解决方法可能只能由某种非人类智慧生物提出。根据麦金,难以解决的哲学问题包括心物问题人格同一性意义问题英语meaning (philosophy of language)自由意志以及知识论,无论是从先天证明的角度,还是从经验主义的立场[4]

人物

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  • 柯林·麦金
  • 哈耶克:对于弗里德里希·哈耶克,解释心灵问题本身就是个逻辑上的矛盾,这种不完全性(心灵解释自己的无能)是哥德尔不完备定理的一个例子。哈耶克不是自然主义不可知论者,即那些认为科学目前不能提供身心问题解释的人。哈耶克认为,彻底上,这个问题就是解不开。[5]
  • 约翰·廷德尔:见John Tyndall (1871),Fragments of Science
  • 诺姆·乔姆斯基:诺姆·乔姆斯基认为,所有认知能力都在生物学上被限制。[6]见Noam Chomsky,Language and problems of knowledge

现象和本体

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伊曼努尔·康德在《纯粹理性批判》中,认为人类的思想不可避免地受到范畴的限制。

量的范畴 – 单一、多数、全体

质的范畴 – 实在、否定、限制
关系的范畴 – 依存性和自存性(实性和偶性)、 因果性和独立性、协同性

模态的范畴 – 可能性英语Logical possibility或不可能性、存在或不存在、必然或偶然。

这些限制了人类的思维。可以了解的是现象,范畴之外不可了解的是本体,即物自体

新神秘主义

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变成蝙蝠会怎样?汤玛斯·内格尔这样发问。 他提到了对于经验的主观性英语subjective character of experience认知封闭的可能性,以及其对于唯物主义还原论科学的意义。 欧文·弗拉纳根英语Owen Flanagan在1991年的著作《心灵的科学》(Science of the Mind)中提到,一些当代思想家认为意识永远不会得到解释。弗拉纳根把他们叫做“新神秘主义者”,根据的是乐队Question Mark and the Mysterians英语Question Mark and the Mysterians的名字[7]根据麦金,心物问题的正确答案不能被理解,深深地写在我们的基因里面。

显现唯物论是个类似但不同的理论,认为人类还不够聪明以决定“心灵与物质的关系”。[来源请求][可疑]

批判

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尽管意识的本性是复杂的,但是根据一些哲学家,这并不意味著认知的封闭性,因此,麦金的论证是错误的。[8][9][10]

参见

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参考资料

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  1. ^ Leslie Marsh (ed.), Hayek in Mind: Hayek's Philosophical Psychology, Emerald Group Publishing, 2011, p. xv.
  2. ^ Harris, Errol E, Reflections on the Problem of Consciousness: 51, 2006, McGinn's stance, while he denies the possibility of ever understanding the causal connection, may be regarded as "naturalistic" in the sense that he does not reject the validity of neuro-physiological theory, and does not doubt that brain activity accompanies conscious states. .
  3. ^ Ross Wilson (ed.), The Meaning of "Life" in Romantic Poetry and Poetics, Routledge, 2009, p. 88: "[McGinn] calls his stance "transcendental naturalism..."
  4. ^ McGinn, Colin. The Problem of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies. 1994, 76 (2–3): 133–56 [2020-02-25]. doi:10.1007/bf00989821. (原始内容存档于2019-12-10). it combines deep epistemic transcendence with the denial that what thus transcends is thereby non-natural. 
  5. ^ Butos, W.N. The Social Science of Hayek's The Sensory Order. Advances in [[奥地利经济学派|]]. Emerald. 2010: 127–28 [2020-02-25]. ISBN 978-1-84950975-6. (原始内容存档于2020-08-12). 1. Explanation is delimited by the apparatus of classification (the mind)... 2. An apparatus of classification cannot explain anything more complex than itself... 3. Therefore, the mind cannot fully explain itself... 
  6. ^ Chomsky, Noam, Language and problems of knowledge: 152, 1988 .
  7. ^ Flanagan, Owen. The Science of the Mind. 麻省理工学院出版社. 1991: 313. ISBN 978-0-262-56056-6. 
  8. ^ Garvey, James. What Does McGinn Think We Cannot Know?. Analysis. July 1997, 57 (3): 196–201. doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00074. Nothing he says gets him the conclusion that we cannot solve the mind-body problem, given any of these interpretations of what is cognitively closed to us 
  9. ^ Kirk, Robert. Why Shouldn't We Be Able to Solve the Mind-Body Problem?. Analysis. January 1991, 51 (1): 17–23. JSTOR 3328626. doi:10.2307/3328626. He recognizes that many will find this outrageous; and indeed I think that his reasoning is fundamentally flawed and his central thesis false. But it will be worth trying to discover what has gone wrong. 
  10. ^ Kriegel, Uriah. The new mysterianism and the thesis of cognitive closure. Acta Analytica. December 2003, 18 (1–2): 177–191. doi:10.1007/s12136-003-1020-1. it is incoherent to suppose that we cannot understand what would count as a solution to a problem we can and do understand